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Abstract
The purpose of this note is to investigate the theoretical rela-
tionship between the systematic risk of equity, the systematic risk of
debt, the systematic risk of the unlevered firm, and leverage in the
presence of default risk. The cash-flow approach is adopted in con-
trast to the literature. The analysis demonstrates that a truncation
factor (or survival probability) exists in addition to Hamada and
Rubinstein's traditional formulation. Hence, the result derived here
is more general.

SYSTEMATIC RISK, LEVERAGE, AND DEFAULT RISK
In their classical paper, Modigliani and Miller (M&M) [15, 16],
based upon the risk-class assumption and the arbitrage argument, have
shown the famous propositions I and II. By integrating M&M's proposi-
tion I with the mean-variance, Hamada [9] and Rubinstein [18] have
shown that the systematic risk of a firm's equity should be positively
correlated with the firm's leverage. Numerous subsequent studies have
empirically and theoretically investigated the effect of financial
leverage on the systematic risk of equity [3, 4, 7, 8, 10, 14], How-
ever, only few of them have incorporated default risk in the analysis
[7, 8].
The purpose of this note is to investigate the theoretical rela-
tionship between the systematic risk of equity and leverage in the
presence of default risk within a framework of one-period Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM) under uncertainty. We adopt cash-flow approach
which distinguishes from [2] and [8] with option-pricing approach and
[7] with expected-rate-of-return approach. In Section I, we discuss
the pricing of market values of different claims, which is borrowed
from Chen [6].* In Section II, we derive the relationship between
systematic risks and leverage. Section III presents the conclusion.
I. Market Values of Different Claims
Sharpe [19], Lintner [12], and Mossin [17] have derived the fol-
lowing two-parameter equilibrium valuation raoidel, referred to as the
Capital Asset Pricing Model, in a hypothetical world with three key
assumptions.
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where
V the equilibrium value of asset j;
E(Y.) = the expected value of the end-of-period cash
flows to the owners of asset j;
R • 1 + R~» where R^ is the risk-free interest rate;
Cov(Y.:,R ) = the covariance between the total cash flows of
asset j and the return on the market portfolio;
A = the market price of risk.
Equation (1) states that in equilibrium the value of asset j is
the present value of the certainty-equivalent (CEQ) of the asset's
random cash flow.
A. The Market Value of All-Equity Firm
Denote X as the firm's operating income which is assumed to be
jointly normally distributed with the return on the market portfolio
so that
X = N(X, o£)
— 2
for any given assessment of R and a . The after-tax cash flows tomm
the owners of the unlevered firm are
X(1-t) if X >
(2)
if X <'"I o
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where x is the proportional corporate income tax. Therefore, the mar-
2
ket value of the unlevered firm is given by
V
u
= (1-t)[E (X) - XCov (X,R
m
)](R)"1 . (3)
where
E
Q
(X) = Xf(X)dX; Cov
n
(X,R ) = E{ [Xn-En (X) ] [R -E(R) ]},U m u u m m
"3
the partial covariance between X truncated from upward and R
m
B. The Market Value of Debt
For simplicity, we assume that the total promised payment to bond-
holders is tax deductible. Bondholders receive their contractual
claims of D at the end of the period if the firm is solvent, and the
4
entire value of the firm if the firm is declared bankrupt. Hence,
the total cash flows to bondholders at the end of the period are
" D if X >_ D
\-\
.
(4)
X if < X < D
if X < 0.
The market value of debt can be expressed as
V
Q
= {D[1-F(D)] + [EJj(X) - ACov°(X,Rm)]} (R)"
1
(5)
|0 - -
where F(D) =
I f(X)dX, the probability that the firm is declared
bankrupt.
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C. The Market Value of Equity
At the end of the period shareholders receive the after-tax
residual value of the firm if it remains solvent, and they receive
nothing if the firm goes bankrupt. Therefore, the end-of-period cash
flows to shareholders are
(1-t)(X-D) if X > D
h'\ - (6 >
if X 1 D.
The market value of equity can be expressed as
V
£
= (1-T){E
D
(X) - XCov
D
(X,R
m)
- D[1-F(D)]} (R)"1 . (7)
D. The Market Value of the Levered Firm
The market value of the levered firm is simply the sum of market
values of its debt and equity. Adding V_ in (5) and V_ in (7), we get
D J-
V = {(1-t)[E (X) - XCovQ (X,Rm)] + t[E°(X)
- ACov^X.R^ ]
+ tD[1-F(D)]} (R)"1 (8)
Then, substituting V
u
in (3) and VD in (5) into (8), the market value
of the levered firm can be expressed as
V
-
V
E
+ V
D
= V
u
+ TV (9)
Equation (9) shows that the market value of the levered firm is the sum
of the market value of the unlevered firm plus the tax subsidy on debt.
This result is consistent with M&M [16] within a framework of risky
debt.
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II. Systematic Risks and Leverage
In this section we are trying to develop the theoretical linkage
between systematic risks of equity, debt, and the unlevered firm and
leverage.
A. The Systematic Risk of Equity, the Systematic Risk of the Unlevered
Firm, and Leverage
From Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin's CAPM, the systematic risk of equity
is defined as
s
Cov(Y R
m)
g , - (10)
2 .
where a is the variance of market portfolio's returns. Substituting
m ™
(6) into this definition yields
(l-T)Cov(X,R
m)
8 ~ • [l-F(D)] (11)
E m
By the same token, substituting (2) into the definition of the
systematic risk of the unlevered firm yields
Cov(Y ,R )
„u u m
V a
2
u m
(1-t)Cov(X,R )
m
u m
[l-F(O)] (12)
" " 2
By solving (11) and (12) for (l-T)Cov(X,Rm) /a , we can derive the
relationship between the systematic risk of equity and the systematic
risk of the unlevered firm as follows
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E
This result shows that the systematic risk of the levered firm is
equal to the systematic risk of the unlevered firm adjusted for the
difference in equity value of the two firms and the survival proba-
bility (the bracket in (13)). When no bankruptcy risk (or no truncation
of the firm's operating income distribution) is assumed, (13) is identical
to Hamada's [9] result. Furthermore, substituting the accounting identity
in (9) for V , we derive the following expression:
This result states that the systematic risk of equity is equal to
the systematic risk of the same firm without leverage times one plus
the leverage ratio (debt to equity) multiplied by one minus tax rate
and times the survival probability. If no bankruptcy risk is assumed,
the second bracket in (13) disappears and (14) is identical to what
Hamada [9] and Rubinstein [18] have shown. Hence, the model we derive
here is claimed to be more general.
To further study the comparative statics of (14), we use numerical
analysis instead of mathematic analysis for the sake of simplicity.
The data for the numerical example is given in table I.
Insert Table I
Figure 1 illustrates the effect of leverage (debt ratio) on the
systematic risk of equity. As is expected from this figure, the systematic
risk of equity increases monotonically with leverage.
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Insert Figure 1
Figure 2 shows the effect of the face value of debt on the systematic
risk of equity. Not surprisingly, the systematic risk, of equity is a
positive function of the face value of debt.
Insert Figure 2
In figure 3, the impact of business risk on the systematic risk of
equity is depicted, where business risk is represented by standard deviation
of the firm's operating income. To isolate the leverage effect, we
designate the face value of debt equal to 150,000. As is evident from
this figure, the more risky the firm (the higher the standard deviation)
,
the smaller the systematic risk of equity because stockholders profit
from the probability that the value of the firm will exceed the face
value of debt.
Insert Figure 3
In the option pricing literature, Black and Scholes [2] and Galai
and Masulis [8] have shown that
3 = n
s
B
V
D
3V
E V
= (1 + r> t? s (15)
E
where
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3V
E V
n c
=
~^T7 * TT~ » the elasticity of equity value with respect
E to firm value;
V
6 = the systematic risk of the firm,
Comparing (14) with (15) without corporate tax, both equations are
quite similar in the sense that the truncation factor in (14) and the
partial-derivative factor in (15) both reflect the default risk, and
the relationship between the systematic risk of equity and leverage
is curvilinear. However, (15) with elasticity concept is not as empir-
ically appealing as (14) with truncated distribution. The latter can
be estimated in a way similar to Aharony, Jones, and Swary [1J, who
estimate the probability of bankruptcy from a truncated normal distribu-
tion. Omitting the truncation factor is (14) which is always less than
one with positive leverage will cause the systematic risk of equity
overestimated. Hence, the implication of this model stands along the
same line as Hamada [9, p. 445] in the sense that it should be pos-
sible to improve the forecast of a stock's systematic risk by fore-
casting the total firm's systematic risk first, and then make adjust-
.
ments on leverage and survival probability.
B. The Systematic Risk of Equity, the Systematic Risk of the Unlevered
Firm, and the Systematic Risk of Debt
Like the systematic risk of equity, the systematic risk of debt
Q
can be defined by the CAPM as
jj Cov(VV
2
D ra
Cov(X,R )
m
D m
f- [F(D) - F(0)] (16)
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Given the result shown in (16), we can further demonstrate the
linkage between the systematic risk of equity, the systematic risk of
the unlevered firm, and the systematic risk of debt (the proof is
shown in the Appendix)
.
V V
6
S
= B
U [1+(1-t) =£] - 6D [(1-t) =2] (17)
E E
This result is consistent with Conine [7] in the presence of
risky corporate debt. The same result without corporate tax can be
9derived from the option pricing model. The model says that the system-
atic risk of equity is a weighted average of the systematic risk of
the unlevered firm and the systematic risk of debt (with negative
weight), which is intuitively appealing in a portfolio sense. By using
the same numerical example, figure 2 illustrates that the systematic
risk of debt not only is a positive function of the face value of debt
but cannot in equilibrium exceed the systematic risk of the unlevered
firm. Under this kind of formulation, the truncation of the distribution
due to default risk is not shown in (17), instead is embedded in 6
and leverage. When corporate debt is riskfree, is equal to zero
and (17) is identical to the traditional formulation shown by Hamada
and Rubinstein.
III. Conclusion
The purpose of this note is to investigate the theoretical rela-
tionship between systematic risks and leverage in the presence of default
risk. The cash-flow approach is used in contrast to the literature.
The analysis shows that a truncation factor (or survival probability)
exists in addition to Hamada [9] and Rubinstein's [18] traditional for-
mulation. Hence, the result derived here is claimed to be more general.
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Footnotes
*University\of Illinois at Urbana/Champaign.
(1) There exists a fixed risk-free interest rate in perfectly
competitive capital markets; (2) all investors have homogeneous ex-
pectations with respect to the probability distributions of future
yields on risky assets; and (3) all investors are risk-averse and the
expected utility of terminal wealth maximizers.
2
Because of the existence of default risk, the assumption of
quadratic utility is implicitly required to apply the CAPM.
3
For discussion of truncation, refer to Lintner [13] and Chen [6].
4
This is an agency-cost issue. A numerical example can illus-
trate why bondholders will not receive the entire after-tax value of
the firm if the firm is declared bankrupt. Let D = $100, t = 50%,
and X = $99. In this case, the firm is declared bankrupt because
X < D. If bondholders had to receive the after-tax value of the
firm, $49.5, they would be better off by making side payments of the
one dollar short to stockholders to persuade them not to go bankrupt.
Hence, bondholders would net $99, which is exactly equal to X.
We assume that there are no costs of voluntary liquidation or
bankruptcy, e.g., court or reorganization costs.
We should expect to get identical results as shown by Galai
and Masuli [8] in an option pricing context.
No corporate and personal taxes are assumed.
Q
Sfnce the debt by nature is a single-period discount bond, the
problem of duration on the systematic risk of debt does not arise.
9Black and Scholes [2] and Galai and Masulis [8] have shown that
6
S
= N(d )rp 6V (18)
E
6
D
= [1-N(d )] ^- 6
V
(19)
D
where N(») is the standardized normal cumulative probability density
V
function. Then, multiplying (19) by—, adding (18), and rearranging
E
yields
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E
V
E
6
v
a+ ^)- sDA.
E V E
Q.E.D,
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Table I
Parameters for Numerical Example
Corporate tax rate (t)° =0.5
Expected market return (R ) = 0.15
m
One plus risk free rate (R) =1.05
Standard deviation of market return (a ) = 0.2
m
Standard deviation of operating income (a ) = 80,000
Mean of operating income (X) = 120,000
Correlation coefficient between the firm and the market = 0.5
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Figure 1. The relationship between systematic risks and debt ratio
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Figure 2. The relationship between systematic risks and face value of debt
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Figure 3. The relationship between systematic risk and standard deviation
Appendix
Let's restate equation (14) as follows
R
S
_
fi
u ,V
r
l-F(D),
S " 6 X } [ 1-F(0) J
a ,
V
u x „u ,V rF(D)-F(0).
- 8 M -.8 (v~) [ 1-F(0) 1 (18)
E E
We also can derive the relationship between the systematic risk
of the unlevered firm and the systematic risk of debt by solving (12)
and (16) for Cov(X,Rm)/a 2 .
m
V
ft
u
= «
D t\-r \ -2. r_l=£i2i_i (19)& - 3 (1-t) v L F(D )_F(o)J K^>
u
Then, substituting (19) into the second term of (18) yields
E E
V V
= e
u[i+(i-x) -2.] - sd [(i-t) =2.]
E E
Q.E.D.
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